Essay
by David Lange
It does no harm to wonder why people not unlike us
should have chosen to shelter under the nuclear umbrella. Why do
populations with which we have much in common allow their governments
to build or deploy nuclear weapons, or actively seek the protection
of powers which have nuclear weapons?
It is on the face of it irrational to build an arsenal
whose use would make the whole planet uninhabitable, to base a defence
on a professed willingness to risk the lives of every last one of
us, and to underpin international relationships with fear of the
unthinkable. This is the essence of nuclear armament.
For all its perversity, the necessity of nuclear weaponry
is accepted, or argued, by many who are not otherwise out of touch
with reality. Indeed, when New Zealand first adopted its nuclear
free policy, the most common rebuke from the policys critics,
both foreign and domestic, was that New Zealands exclusion
of nuclear weapons from its territory was unrealistic. Its supposed
idealism was the quality for which the nuclear free policy was most
frequently faulted.
This view was not the exclusive property of a political
elite. Support for nuclear deterrence was, and is, common among
people with whom many in New Zealand might easily identify. Many
of us have close ties with the United Kingdom, a country in which
the Labour party finally accepted that it could not win a general
election until it abandoned its policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament.
The Australian Labor party discarded its commitment to nuclear arms
control after it came to office, and became the sternest critic
of New Zealands policy.
Exactly why people in the United Kingdom and Australia
should support nuclear armament, or why voters in many democratic
societies should allow their governments to spend countless billions
arming themselves with weapons of mass destruction, is complex,
but fear lies at the bottom of it. In the cold war era, fear was
palpable in Europe. Nobody could escape the tension between the
great power blocs. Fear that enemies might use nuclear weapons against
civilian populations was genuine, whatever its source. Insecurity
allowed, or perhaps demanded, an acceptance of the doctrines of
nuclear deterrence. Although their use might be threatened, there
was consolation in the assumption that the weapons might never be
used. The risks of deterrence were lesser in this view than the
risks of disarmament.
There was far less immediate cause for fear in this
country, but it was present nonetheless. There was considerable
attachment to the ANZUS alliance, and some doubt that the nuclear
free policy would prevail once it became clear that its price was
the end of the active alliance relationship. While alliance membership
was most often presented in political and diplomatic circles as
a means of getting a hearing from the powerful and promoting our
wider international interests, public support for the alliance was
more visceral. It rested on the belief that New Zealand needed a
powerful protector.
This belief lost currency only gradually. Events in
the 1980s saw the popularity of the nuclear free policy come to
outweigh any lingering sense of insecurity.
The end of the cold war put an end to much of the
fear which had shaped international relations. The nuclear powers
were accordingly able to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons
and limit their deployment. But nuclear deterrence is far from abandoned.
It is still the foundation of military strategy among the nuclear
powers. There remain active deployments of nuclear weapons. Nuclear
weapons are not routinely deployed on surface vessels, but the right
to deploy them is reserved. Strategic doctrines allow for the first
use of nuclear weapons or for their use against countries not themselves
armed with nuclear weapons. Technological refinement of weapons
and weapons systems continues.
In a climate where the need to openly threaten the
use of nuclear weapons has diminished, their possession is more
easily tolerated. There seems, for the time being, small chance
of their use. They are seen as insurance against some unspecified
future risk.
Recent interest in New Zealand in reviving a form
of active alliance with the United States feeds on something of
this complacency. Because nuclear deterrence is no longer obtrusive,
the nuclear free policy may be presented as something of purely
symbolic value which could usefully be traded off in exchange for
the benefits of a closer relationship with the United States. The
advantages of such a closer relationship are rightly a matter for
debate, but there is no doubting the price, as a recent episode
confirms. New Zealand is still formally, if not actively, allied
with the United States. It responded to the terrible events of September
11 with uncalculated sympathy. It sent members of its armed forces
into danger in support of the war against terrorism. For all of
that we are allowed the overweening condescension of being not an
ally but a "very very very good friend". Much foreign
policy debate in the future will revolve around whether there is
more we can, or should do, in exchange for a different form of words,
and what such words might actually be worth.
New Zealands commitment to its nuclear free
policy was tested in many ways in the 1980s, but we were to a great
extent distant from the insecurity which led others to embrace nuclear
deterrence. We are not in the same way immune from the complacency
which allows many to believe that nuclear weapons are no longer
a danger simply because their use is no longer openly threatened.
The weapons are still with us, and there are still those who justify
their presence. Complacency and indifference may in the end prove
a greater threat than insecurity to the nuclear free policy.
David Lange
This essay originally appeared in
Bombs
Away the catalogue
Published June 2002
$10.00
ISBN# 0-9582359-2-9
16 pages
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Use Information Centre
Peace Foundation
Bombs Away
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Essays
Living
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Sophie Jerram
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